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Since its inception, the Equator Principles Association 
introduced a risk management framework in response to the 
ever-changing environmental and social risk in projects. The 
Equator Principles (EPs) result from minimum standards for 
risk management to stop the race to the bottom. In June 2013, 
EP3 was introduced, and climate change requirements were 
added to address the 'transition towards an ethical and low- 
carbon economy.'1 This eventually led to the newly revised 
Equator Principles 4 (EP4s), 'Climate Change Risk 
Assessment' (transition risk), in July 2020. This article 
analyses the effect of the transition risk of EP4 to determine 
whether this new addition will support or inhibit oil and gas 
project financing in Africa amidst the ongoing energy 
transition by questioning the underlying assumptions upon 
which the policy design was developed. 
The article concluded that consideration for project financing 
in Africa could be expected to address the energy needs in 
Africa while at the same time essentially pushing governments 
to take into consideration climate change by putting in place 
processes,  policies,  and  systems  to  manage  these  risks.'2 
Furthermore, the transition risks definition and implementing 
standards of EP4 are broadly worded, allowing adapting the 
principles to a wide range of regimes that positively 
contribute to these domains. This essentially enables 
consideration of ethical transition and provides for 
coordination and coherence across different policy domains. 
 
Keywords: Climate change; Equator principles; Corporate 





1  Woersdoerfer M, ‘Climate finance–a business-ethical analysis’ (SSRN 
3489487 2019)  
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The further development of the EPs is based on the shift in 
environmental policy initiatives such as the 2015 Paris 
Agreement, which aims to intensify the regulatory activities 
of governments with the addition of national initiatives. The 
support for this shift is reflected in the preamble found in the 
EP4, which states that: 
 
[We] support the objectives of the 2015 Paris 
Agreement and recognise that EPFIs have a role to 
play in improving the availability of climate-related 
information…such as assessing the potential transition 
and physical risks of projects financed under the 
Equator Principles:3 
 
This new narrative, at a first glance, appears to have 
profound implications for financing projects in Africa 
because there is a need for infrastructural growth, which can 
potentially promote regional socio-economic development, 
poverty reduction, and foreign investment.4 Furthermore, 
IEA scenarios show that the increased economic growth and 
domestic demand makes projects in sub-Saharan Africa 
globally more competitive, which encourages investment. 
This essentially means that oil and gas production in sub- 
Saharan Africa is expected to increase to 10 per cent and 25 
per cent in 2040.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa holds half of the continent's oil and 
gas resources.6 However, the continent experiences various 
energy challenges. The energy needs for Africa are expected 
to increase due to urbanisation, which is expected to grow to 
580 million in 2040. Additionally, the anticipated boom in 
population growth and industrialisation will necessitate more 
energy, including fossil fuels and renewables. Consequently, 
 
 
3     Supra, note 2. 
4        International Energy Agency, ‘Africa Energy Outlook, World Energy Outlook 
Special Report’ (IEA Report, 2021)  
<https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2f7b6170-d616-4dd7-a7caa65a3- 
a332fc1/Africa_Energy_Outlook_2019.pdf> accessed 7 June 2021. pp 32. 
5     ibid. pp 185. 
6     Olawuyi Damilola, Extractives Industry Law in Africa, (Springer 
International Publishing, 2018)
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some scholars have questioned the readiness of African 
countries to bid farewell to fossil fuels.7 
The above notwithstanding, the relevance of analysing 
the EP transition risk is to understand better how the 
implementation processes fit into the policy narrative of the 
energy transition. Therefore, this article's main objective is to 
analyse whether the newly revised EP4 transition risks will 
either support or inhibit future oil and gas project financing 
in Africa. The article aims to offer contributions by 
formulating the following sub-questions, which will be 
discussed in the relevant sections: 
 
1. How does the institutional and implementation setup of 
the EP support or inhibit project finance in Africa? 
 
2. What are the concerns related to transition risks on future 
projects in Africa? 
 
3. What potential positive factors be embedded in the 
"climate change risk assessment" as a climate risk 
reduction strategy by the EPFIs? 
 
4. What is the importance of the EP4 as a policy standard in 
encouraging coordination and coherence across different 
policy domains? 
 
This article addresses the above questions in six sections, 
following this introduction. Section two analyses the 
institutional and implementation setup of the EP; section 
three highlights the concerns related to transition risks; 
section four discusses in detail climate risk assessment; 
section five spotlights the importance of the EP4 as a policy 






7  Nalule V, ‘Transitioning to a low carbon economy: Is Africa ready to bid 
farewell to fossil fuels?' (2020) The Palgrave Handbook of Managing Fossil 
Fuels and Energy Transitions (pp. 261-286). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. 





2. THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES: 
IMPLEMENTATION 
PROCESS 
This section aims to understand the implementation process 
of the EPs. Principles such as the EP play a role in 'financial 
systems in sustainability transitions processes'. Hence it is 
essential to understand the benchmarks that indicate how the 
financial system will respond to climate change.8 
The underlying policy rationale of the EP became 
fundamental due to the 'inability of national governments to 
sufficiently address environmental and social risks, and that 
in itself became a noteworthy political risk aspect when it 
came to international project finance.9 This is because there is 
perceived incompetence of national governmental 
'accountability mechanisms'.10 
The EP4 divides projects into three categories: A, B, and 
C, depending on the risk involved. This establishes how the 
EPFIs will demand the borrower to undertake the rest of the 
principles and the degree of scrutiny the EPFI's will require 
of the Project.11 As a general rule, projects in category A 
prompt thorough due diligence responsibility for both the 
lender and borrower (risky projects), with those 
responsibilities lessening in extent and size for category B 
projects, whereas for projects in category C, these 





8 Naidoo CP, ‘Transcending the Interregnum: Exploring how Financial 
Systems Relate to Sustainability Transition Processes’ (Doctoral 
dissertation, Univer-sity of Sussex 2020). 
9 Ong DM, ‘Public Accountability for Private International Financing of Na- 
tural Resource Development Projects: The UN Rule of Law Initiative and 
the Equator Principles’ (2016)85(3)201-33 Nordic Journal of International 
Law.  
10 Haack P, Schoeneborn D, and Wickert C, ‘Exploring the Constitutive 
Conditions for a Self-Energizing Effect of CSR Standards: The Case of the 
'Equator Principles.' (University of Zurich Institute of Organization and 
Administrative Science IOU Working Paper, 2010) 115. 
11 Hansen RC, ‘The impact of the equator principles on lender liability: risks 
of responsible lending' (SSRN 2006) 
12    ibid. 
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It might also be argued that the introduction of climate 
change risk aims to aid the EPFI in addressing climate change 
issues, manage credit and reputational risks caused by climate 
change impacts, and gain legitimacy by practicing Corporate 
Social Responsibility  (CSR)'13  and  most  importantly  to 
'maximise profits.'14 
It is generally believed that the EPs are not guidelines 
and proposals but rather more of a guide to assess processes. 
Even carbon-emitting projects that contribute to climate 
change can still be financed in compliance with the EPs.15The 
assumption is that the EPs are structurally set up so that 
projects cannot escape them. Still, the reality is that 
signatories define their implementation procedures thatdiffer 
somewhat on the effect of the principles on the projects. 
Research shows that this deliberate structure needs legitimate 
commitments or standard implementation components and 
relies significantly upon the reputational benefits it provides 
members.16 
Researchers, however, critique that the optional 'nature 
of the EPs subsequently means that signatories have a broad 
discretion to avoid responsibility, which implies that this 
dedication is reliant upon the abstract evaluation of the 
signatory. This infers a signatory may feel free to finance a 
project if it complies with the EPs for any undertaking.17A 
question may arise as to what then happens if member EPFIs 
fail to consider the Eps? One noteworthy aspect is found in 





13  Aboutorabifard H, ‘Equator principles and climate change issues: 
Examining the EPs’ climate change policies and analyzing the likely 
effectiveness of these policies’ (Master's thesis, University of Waterloo 
2016). 
14  Kulkarni P, ‘Pushing lenders to over‐comply with environmental 
regulations: A developing country perspective’ (2010)22(4) Journal of 
International Development: The Journal of the Development Studies 
Association May 470- 82. 
15 Weber O, Acheta E, ‘The Equator Principles: Do They Make Banks More 
Su-stainable. Inquiry’ (Working Paper 2016)16(05) 
16 Christopher Wright, ‘Investigating the Discursive Power of Multilateral 
Fina-ncial Institutions’, (2005), pp 13-14. 
17 Adeyemi A, ‘Changing the face of sustainable development in developing 
co- untries: the role of the international finance corporation.’(2014)16(2) 
Environmental Law Review 91-106. 





[The] Equator Principles are a baseline and framework 
for developing individual, internal environmental and 
social policies, procedures, and practices…and do not 
create any rights in, or liability to, any person, public 
or private. Financial institutions adopt and implement 
the Equator Principles "voluntarily and 
independently" (emphasis mine), without reliance on 
or recourse to the IFC, the World Bank Group, the 
Equator Principles Association, or other EPFIs.18 
 
This essentially means that there is 'no recourse against a 
bank that adopts the Principles in name only and fails to 
impose any standards' and that 'banks probably will escape 
legal liability for violations of the Principles…and will only 
be held accountable in the court of public opinion. This 
shows that where a bank fails to take account of the EPs, 
there is no detrimental sanction other than being removed as 
an equator bank.19 
A closer look at the literature shows that individual firms 
voluntarily embrace the guidelines. Signatories stressed 
incredibly the point that they are to be seen as individuals. 
Thus, hypothetically, EP signatories can only speak of 'we as 
an adopter of the EP' and not 'we the Equator banks.'20 
However, the EPs signatories are expected to obey the rules 
to which they have committed, even if there is no severe 
penalty of place21 
Moreover, the preamble of the EP4 acknowledges that 
'the application of the Equator Principles can contribute to 
delivering on the objectives and outcomes of the United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)', which 
shows why there was a need to revise climate change risk 
 
 
18  ‘The Equator Principles EP4 - July 2020’. 
19 Hardenbrook A, ‘Equator Principles: The Private Financial Sector's 
Attempt at Environmental Responsibility’ (2007)40 The. Vand. J. Transnat'l 
197. 
20 O'Sullivan NA, ‘Social accountability and the finance sector: the case of 
Eq- uator Principles (EP) institutionalisation.’ ( PhD thesis, Amsterdam 
Business School, Universiteit van Amsterdam 2010). 
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factors.22 However, studies find that the extractive sector's 
role in sustainable development is controversially argued. On 
the one hand, the sector's harmful effects significantly 
outweigh the economic and social advantages. But, on the 
other hand, it is contended that the sector is crucial for 
economic growth globally, as it promotes poverty 
eradication, revenue creation for government, and economic 
development.23 However, the EP4s have been structured to 
allow such a trade-off mechanism, which is found in 
Principle 2.24 
What is happening now is that the EPs have the EPFIs 
focusing on all the parts of the Project and ideally driving 
them to require terms and conditions that lessen the effects of 
climate change on the Project. However, even though the 
EPs aim to finance oil and gas projects, it discredits the whole 
initiative. If anything, the broadly worded guiding principles 
of the EPs, means that banks can adapt the principles to a 
wide range of regimes operating in different countries or 
across a wide range of legal regimes,25 and what is evident is 
that the EPs do not actually 'stipulate an absolute prohibition 
on financing high GHG polluting projects.'26 
 
3. CLIMATE CHANGE IN AFRICA: 
FUTURE OF PROJECT FINANCE 
 
As the exploitation of natural resources across the globe 
continues to increase, international financing of these 
resources to develop projects in remote regions in developing 
 
 
22   Ibid. 
23 Weber O, Banks Y, ‘Corporate sustainability assessment in financing the 
ex- tractive sector’ (2012)2(1) Journal of Sustainable Finance & Investment. 
64-81. 
24  ‘The Equator Principles EP4 - July 2020’ (n 3). In this case as per the illustr- 
ative list of issues found in Exhibit II “requirements under host country la- 
ws and regulations, applicable international treaties and agreements includ- 
ing the 2015 Paris Climate Change Agreement.” Also see Preamble. 
25  Lance JA, ‘Equator Principles III: a hard look at soft law’ (NC Banking 
Inst 2013) 175 
26  Bowman M, ‘The role of the banking industry in facilitating climate change 
mitigation and the transition to a low-carbon global economy’(2010)27 
Environment and Planning Law Journal 448. 





countries have grown to be more complicated. Thus, 
different financing mechanisms exist for the development of 
such projects, namely project finance.27 The EP4 defines 
project finance as: 
 
[A] method of financing in which the lender looks 
primarily to the revenues generated by a Project, both 
as the source of repayment and security for the 
exposure…In such transactions, the lender is usually 
paid solely or almost exclusively out of the money 
generated by the contracts for the Project's 
output...The consequence is that repayment depends 
primarily on the Project's cash.28 
 
Project finance has a significant role to play in emerging 
markets, where economic growth is increasing and the needs 
for funds are more profound than in developed economies29 
because project finance is regarded as the tool for the 
development of feasible long-term investment projects to 
create profits for governments that will lead to an increase in 
investment in other sectors of a country.30 Therefore, the EP 
scope also provides project-related corporate loans, bridge 
loans, and project finance advisory service options.31 
Although public finance is another alternative, according 
to the International Energy Agency (IEA), public finance 
sources are unlikely to eliminate critical investment gaps 
fuelled by  private  sector  financing.32 On  the  other  hand, 
project finance is favourable, amongst other things, because it 
decreases cash equity commitment, especially where cash 




27   Ong (n 12). 
28  ‘The Equator Principles EP4 - July 2020’ (n 3). pp 30. 
29  ‘The Equator Principles EP4 - July 2020’ (n 3). pp 32. 
30  ‘The Equator Principles EP4 - July 2020’ (n 3). pp 34. 
31  ‘The Equator Principles EP4 - July 2020’ (n 3). See financial products offered at pp 5. 
32    Cozzi and others (n 5). pp 34. 
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Which prevents governments from intervening in projects 
that have loans from international banks.33 
Furthermore, even though Africa only accounts for 2% 
of the global emissions from 1890 till present,34 this, however, 
does not imply that projects are to be approved without 
taking into account the climate change impact it may have, 
especially if one considers that climate change concerns have 
become the dominant focal point in project finance on 
account of their connection to the idea of economic 
development and sustainability, which the International 
Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD )'characterised 
as an advancement that addresses the issues of the present 
without trading off the capability of the future generation to 
address their needs.35 
Developing countries are said to have depicted their 
national public policies approach based on achieving socio- 
economic objectives. The assumption is that those objectives 
now stand in limbo, with the introduction of the EP4 
transition risk on projects. However, this article aims to 
debunk that assumption and argues that the introduction of 
transition risk is because since developed countries are far 
more experienced and have considerable expertise in 
enforcing a policy that influences low-carbon technology 
investment, this has given birth to emerging 'best practice' 
policies to influence the promotion of low-carbon 
technology, that promote particular cultural and economic 
conditions, and the EP4 is an example of that,36 which 
essentially aims to push governments to consider 'processes, 






33  Clews R, ‘Project finance for the international petroleum industry’ 
(Academic Press 2016) 260. 
34    Cozzi and others (n 5). pp 194. 
35  International Institute for Sustainable Development, ‘Sustainable 
Development’ (IISD, 2021) <https://www.iisd.org/about-iisd/sustainable-
development> accessed 15 June 2021. 
36  Aldy JE, ‘The crucial role of policy surveillance in international climate 
policy’ (2014)126 Climatic Change 279-92. 
37    ‘The Equator Principles EP4 - July 2020’ (n 3). 





The problem with policies such as the EP4 is that such 
frameworks do not offer ways to reconcile these challenges 
such as financing projects amidst the energy transition but 
leave it up to the EPFIs to make their assessment, which can 
prove challenging because the planning and timing of climate 
change in a particular setting are unknown. Hence, a 
situational analysis is a powerful instrument 'for 
organisations to utilise in their tactical setup processes, such 
as employing a situational analysis and other tactical planning 
instruments.'38 
Apart from economic development, Africa also aims to 
tackle the energy challenges it continues to face. Scholars 
have analysed the nexus between the UN SDG 7 on energy 
access and the achievement of other SDGs. It is argued that it 
is impossible to achieve all the other SDGs, including SDG 1 
on poverty eradication, without tackling the energy access 
challenges in Africa.39 This is because it is estimated that 
about 900 million people are without access to clean cooking 
facilities and around 600 million people are without access to 
electricity in sub-Saharan Africa.40 
However, advancements to explore the extractive 
industry also need to recognise the need to adapt to the 
energy transition by progressively moving toward 
diversifying the energy sector through renewables. Nalule, 
however, while advocating for her novel concept of 'energy 
progression',asserts that this is to be expected in developed 
regions such as Europe, as global decision-making efforts 
must consider not only economic development but also the 
geographical and social dimensions of different countries.41 
One takeaway from the literature is that 'it is essential to 




38  TCFD, ‘Implementing the Recommendations of the Task Force on 
Climate-Related Financial Disclosures <https://www.fsbtcfd.org/publi-
cations/fi-nal-implementing-tcfd-recommendations/> accessed 17 June 
2020. pp 9. 
39  Nalule VR, ‘Energy poverty and access challenges in sub-Saharan Africa: 
The role of regionalism.’ (Springer; 2018) 
40  Cozzi and others (n 5).pp 35. 
41  Nalule V, ‘Transitioning to a low carbon economy: Is Africa ready to bid 
farewell to fossil fuels?' (2020) The Palgrave Handbook of Managing Fossil 
Fuels and Energy Transitions (pp. 261-286). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
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not occur on a global scale’.42 And by recognising that there 
arebarriers that hamper adaptation in developing countries 
and that 'adaptation is a complex and continuous process, 
influenced by a variety of factors and conditions at multiple 
scales, some of which may act individually or together to 
hinder this process.'43 
 
 
4. CLIMATE CHANGE: EPFI RISK 
REDUCTION STRATEGIES 
 
Energy transition risks concerning project finance may 
include reputational, policy, and legal risks,44 affecting capital 
costs, as climate-change-related problems may carry 
ramifications  for  future  income  flows.45  Therefore,  the 
concept' Climate change risk' is defined as: 
 
[T]he potential negative impacts of climate 
change on an organisation…climate-related risk can 
also be associated with the transition to a lower-carbon 
global economy, the most common of which relate to 
policy and legal actions, technology changes, market 
responses, and reputational considerations.46 
 
Some researchers believe that the only option is 'fossil 
fuel divestments' to 'accelerate the transition to a low-carbon 
economy.47 However, one cannot agree because the global 
community's focus on energy transition versus African 
energy needs essentially means we have a different 
conversation due to the different energy needs in various 
 
 
42    ibid. 
43  Shackleton S, Ziervogel G, Sallu S, Gill T, and Tschakert P, ‘Why is socially 
just climate change adaptation in sub‐Saharan Africa so challenging? A 
review of barriers identified from empirical cases’(2015)6 Wiley 
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 321-44. 
44  TCFD, ‘Implementing the Recommendations of the Task Force on 
Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (n 42) 78. 
45    ibid, (n 5). pp 5. 
46  TCFD, ‘Implementing the Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-
Related Financial Disclosures (n 42) 78. This article will also extensively 
refer to transition risk and should be regarded as the same thing. 
47  Woersdoerfer M, ‘Climate finance–a business-ethical analysis’ (Research 
Gate, 2019)<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337335180_Climate 
_Finance_-_A_Business-Ethical_Analysis>  





domains. For instance, this is relevant when looking at the 
Global South where, 770 million are without access to 
electricity, out of which sub-Saharan Africa makes up 578 
million.48 
Moreover, one cannot be oblivious to the fact that the 
application of the EPs is based on a broader goal and not 
necessarily based on individual projects. Harden brook also 
validated this stance, by opining that 'although the ability of 
the EPFIs to enforce these principles is limited to the 
contractual relationship of a specific project, their influence 
over the industry grows.'49 
Scholars also argue that the 'EPIII climate change 
policies are left vague. As a result, different opinions have 
evolved around their likely effectiveness in helping the EPFIs 
manage their climate risks and change their behaviour 
towards climate change management.50 However, the new 
EP4 revisions bring new additions for banks to assess climate 
change risks and makes the following inquiries: 
 
1. What are the current and anticipated climate risks 
(transition and physically defined by the TCFD) of the 
project's operations? 
 
2. Does the client have plans, processes, policies, and 
systems to manage these risks? i.e., to mitigate, transfer, 
accept, or control.51 
 
This addition provides a better framework on how to 
manage climate risks associated with projects. 'Annex A' 
further provides that climate change risk should be 'evaluated 
against the project's compatibility with the host country's 
national climate commitments, as appropriate'. This is an 




48  International Energy Agency, ‘Access to Electricity – SDG7: Data and 
Projections – Analysis’ (IEA) <htt- ps://www.iea.org/reports/sdg7-data-
and-projections/access-to-electricity> accessed 14 June 2021. 
49  Hardenbrook A, ‘Equator Principles: The Private Financial Sector's 
Attempt at Environmental Responsibility’ (2007) The. Vand. J. Transnat'l 
L197 
50    Aboutorabifard (n 16). 
51  ‘The Equator Principles EP4 - July 2020’ (n 3). Referred to as “Annex A” 
on certain occasions throughout this article. pp 20. 
The Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy 84 
 
 
will be discussed.52At face value,"Annex A" sounds 
confusing, but what it essentially implies is that: 
 
[D]iscretion is left with national governments on the 
form and timing of their mitigation contributions 
under the Paris agreement…and the resulting 
heterogeneity in mitigation pledges creates a significant 
demand for a well-functioning transparency and review 
mechanism. In particular, the specific forms of 
intended contributions necessitate economic analysis to 
estimate the aggregate effects of these contributions 
and permit "apples-to-apples" comparisons of 
mitigation efforts.53 
 
The key is that the transition will impact the market 
structure, which will affect the creditworthiness of buyers 
and the security of demand. However, interconnecting 
systems, such as the energy issues relating to Africa, provide 
a link to the EP4 transition risk, showing a 'robust system of 
international linkages of regional, national, and sub-national 
policies that allow those risk to be shared.54This approach 
provides the link to form the basis for linkage concerning 
financing projects.55 
This means that there are potential positive factors 
embedded in the 'climate change risk assessment', which 
Bodansky suggests that 'linkage allows countries to adopt 
more ambitious policies…increase market liquidity…and 
reduce price volatility. Linked systems may also provide 
regulatory stability, attractive from the point of view of 
affected firms, in the sense that changes require some 
coordination with other countries with linked emissions 
systems.'56 Furthermore, the difference in climate change 
 
 
52   ibid. 
53      Aldy (n 39). pp 1. 
54  Bodansky D, Hoedl S, Metcalf GE, and Stavins RN, ‘Facilitating linkage of 
heterogeneous regional, national, and sub-national climate policies through 
a future international agreement’ (Harvard Project on Climate Agreements. 
2014 )  
55   Metcalf GE, and Weisbach D. ‘Linking policies when tastes differ: Global 
climate policy in a heterogeneous world’ (2012)6 Review of Environmental 
Economics and Policy 110-29. 
56    Bodansky and others (n 58). pp 5-6. 





adaptation is attributed to the voluntary commitment which 
allows States to design their national mitigation 
contributions, which ensures that they adjust their 
'mitigation goals and policies to their national economic, 
institutional, and political circumstances'. And because 
African countries share the same energy issues,57 there is a 
viewpoint that 'Linking heterogeneous systems can create 
political flexibility to pursue the domestic policy instrument 
that is most feasible politically.'58 
The Action Plan highlighted in Principle 4 of the EP4 can 
feature the connection to encourage project finance in terms 
of transition risks - as far as monetary streams and financial 
transfers, projects can undertake reporting through the 
Action Plan in connection with the 'climate change 
assessment.'59 This integrative method could give a chance to 
depict socio-economic benefits and unequivocal linkage of 
climate change programs. This can essentially mean that 
EPFIs can use this as a basis of 'supportive policy incentives' 
to curb 'potential financial impacts.' This concept is known 
as 'climate-related opportunities', which varies and is 
dependent 'on the region, market, and industry.'60 
 
 
5. COHERENCE AND INTEGRATION 
OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
Sustainability and profit-making should not be seen as two 
different aspects, as feasible, sustainable policies ensure that 




57   Aldy (n 39). pp 3,1. 
58   Bodansky and others (n 58). pp 7. 
59   Aldy (n 39). pp 28. Also see EP4, Principle 4 which states that “to address 
iss-ues raised in the Assessment process and incorporate actions required to 
comply with the applicable standards. Where the applicable standards are 
not met to the EPFI’s satisfaction, the client and the EPFI will agree to an 
Equator Principles Action Plan (EPAP). The EPAP is intended to outline 
gaps and commitments to meet EPFI requirements in line with the 
applicable standards.” 
60  TCFD, ‘Implementing the Recommendations of the Task Force on 
Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (n 42) 73. 
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generation. This is why Wilbanks et al. (2014) opines that it 
is no secret that: 
 
[C]limate change poses risks to goals such as poverty 
reduction…and economic prosperity. Thus, societies 
face the task of defining how to manage these risks and 
what levels of risk without compromising what they 
value most and what defines their societies…Risk 
management and the weighting of various categories of 
risk depend on social definitions of acceptable, 
tolerable, or intolerable consequences.61 
 
It is held that the concept of equator infers a balanced 
representation between 'developed countries, developing 
countries, and emerging markets, which is an indication that 
the EPs applies 'globally on both sides of the 
equator.'62However, we cannot even begin to think that the 
EPs apply equally, given the significant difference between 
developed and developing countries. As such, the EPs should 
be seen as breaking the silos and shifting a paradigm of 
inclusivity. Climate policies must consider tensions between 
global policy interests and the diversity of national and 
regional preferences for different policies. Additionally, it has 
been argued that even though coordinated international 
policies are the subject of climate negotiations, it is clear that 
we are moving towards a more decentralised policy system.63 
Essentially, there must be an understanding of the link 
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such as the EPs, which calls for coherence64 and integration, 
to enable different regions to achieve both sustainability and 
socio-economic prosperity. This bears relevance when 
discussing why other sustainability transitions and effective 
climate risk reduction strategies must be integrated into 
project finance, especially in developing economies.65  This, in 
essence, calls for a 'broad range of national and international 
policy requirements that encourage an all-inclusive 
approach.'66 
Experts contend that the Paris Agreement gives national 
governments the discretion that allows them the timing to 
formulate their mitigating contributions under the 
agreement. It is further argued that, Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions (INDCs) calls for an elaborative 
evaluation and that examples of multilateral policy 
implementation should be used as context to aid in creating a 
climate policy design that can facilitate a comparative analysis 
of mitigating undertakings.67 
There is significant diversity in the formulated mitigation 
contributed by various INDCs. Most developed nations 
focused more on a green economy, with different choices of 
base and target years. The difference in diversity is that some 
industrialised nations acknowledge international trade and 
offset mechanism, whereas others explicitly rule out 
international market mechanisms. These differences enable 
broad participation in the present multilateral policy 
framework. However, the market for fossil fuels will have to 
respond to the INDCs expected implementation, which can 
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Severe criticism when implementing the complete 
requirements of standards such as the EP arise because on a 
global level: 
 
[T]he asymmetric relationship between developed and 
developing countries in terms of their different 
capacities to implement globally adopted rules has been 
mitigated somewhat by the advent of the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities articulated 
in Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration. Principle 11 then 
follows from this and states that objectives and 
priorities should reflect the context of the 
environmental and development context. As a result, 
standards applied by some countries may be 
inappropriate and of unwarranted economic and social 
cost to other countries, particularly developing 
countries.69 
 
Hence the issue is how to accommodate climate change 
and the need for economic growth. Adeyemi opines that 
socio-economic development and the reduction of poverty 
must be recognised as the superseding needs for developing 
nations, thus the importance of the advancement 
arrangements intended to interface social and environmental 
perspectives in economic undertakings.70 
The EP4 is an example of how implementation can be 
based in different policy domains when it comes to coherence 
and integration of climate change policy,71 to prevent 'Global 
South countries from adopting the solutions developed for 
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which may not be compatible with their own.'72To further 
add context to the latter, concerning the discussion in 
question, Nalule asserts that: 
 
[T]he energy access challenges in various developing 
countries have to be put into consideration before we 
can globally agree to say goodbye to fossil fuels and 
other traditional energy sources…a just transition 
should focus on utilising all energy sources to not only 
address energy access challenges but also to ensure the 
economic development of these countries…Of course, 
environmental protection should be at the centre of 
this transition. In this regard, clean technology should 
be employed to utilise fossil fuels. Also, it is essential to 
note that energy transition is a progressive process, and 
it differs depending on the country and region 
concerned.73 
 
This essentially means that it is crucial that the EP4 as a 
policy standard encourages coordination and coherence and 
understand the climate change alleviation activities of 
different nations,74based on the 'project's compatibility with 
the host country's national climate commitments, as 
appropriate', because States are given the discretion to make 
policy decisions that will benefit them,75and ensure a 'strong 
equity basis', which Cullet argues: 
 
[R]emain a vital component of any future climate 
change deal because differential treatment remains a 
condition for developing country participation…and 
that the existing conceptual framework for differential 
treatment based largely on a division between 
developed and developing countries is increasingly 
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because there is little that can justify putting together 
countries...for example, countries whose economies are 
utterly dependent on oil extraction.76 
 
Of course, the authors make very compelling arguments, 
but one cannot simply turn a blind eye to the fact that this is 
what the EPs were designed for. A government cannot ignore 
climate change and expect projects to get financed, especially 
because climate change is an important global issue. Hence, 
countries need to ensure that climate change initiatives are 
linked to other areas of national development, such as 
national security and economic growth. This is intended to 
show these countries' proactive commitment globally 
towards climate action.77 
In essence, what coherence and integration aim to achieve 
is to ensure that a one-size policy is not applied across all 
countries. Therefore, it allows for countries to determine 
what works for them and have inclusivity as part of a just 
transition and not limit access to funding for the financing of 
such projects. This is especially relevant to Africa because the 
continent will require massive energy resources, especially 
fossil fuels, to cope with population growth and booming 
urbanisation. Moreover, industrialisation is escalating in most 
African countries, necessitating further demand, most likely 





Considering the discussion in the previous sections, it is clear 
that climate change risk in the EP4 can be applied based on 
the policy and system present to control these risks. This, in 
essence, ensures that the project's compatibility is not 
founded on a one-size-fits-all policy. It is further asserted 
that the newly revised EP4 transition risks will not inhibit oil 
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and gas project financing in Africa. This is because the scope 
and definition of the EP4 are broad enough, which means 
that interpretations are determined based on the Project, 
allowing the necessary support to finance projects. In reality, 
equator banks have funded oil and gas projects in countries 
such as Egypt, Ghana, Nigeria, and Mozambique, dating as 
far back as 2016. 
Furthermore, critical evaluation of the EP4 as a policy 
standard was influential in encouraging coordination and 
coherence across different policy domains to avoid a failed 
energy transition. This is because the climate change regime 
is built around a convenient but limited framework that 
broadly divides the world between developed and developing 
countries. Essentially projects will get built if conditions are 
favourable, which means the EPs will apply to all without 
any specific requirement for Africa. The key will be the 
quality of the project. 
It can be concluded that the newly revised climate change 
risk will not necessarily negatively affect project financing in 
Africa. However, we should aim to push the conversation in 
a different direction by encouraging governments and 
policymakers to be more proactive about climate change 
while considering their various energy access challenges. This 
means that although Africa should also focus on exploring oil 
and gas, it should also simultaneously convert it to 
sustainable resources, to diversify as a means of adapting to 
climate change and 'progressively' shift towards the energy 
transition. 
